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Hungarian international development co-operation: context, stakeholders and 
performance 
 
1. Introduction 
The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, namely the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the three Baltic countries, and later Romania and 
Bulgaria all became members of the international aid donor community in the past 
decade. In fact, 2011 can be seen as the tenth anniversary of the re-emergence of these 
policies in CEE, as in 2001 some of the countries above accepted their first official 
documents relating to international development. Therefore, it is increasingly 
inappropriate to call these countries ‘new’ donors, although their development policies 
are still very different than those of the older, more established Western donors, or 
internationally agreed ‘best practices’. 
 
This paper takes a closer look at one of these emerging donors, Hungary. Hungary was 
one of the first CEE countries to re-create its international development policy between 
2001 and 2003, but in the past years activity in this field seems to have stagnated. There 
seems to be no clear strategy or direction for the future and no discussion on how and 
why Hungary should aid poorer countries. Resources spent on development cooperation 
are low and stagnating, public attention on the topic is negligible and there is no 
political discourse. This current state of affairs can only partly be explained by the weak 
economic performance of Hungary and resulting government austerity measures. The 
paper argues that in order to gain a better understanding of Hungary’s international 
development policy, one must look at other factors. The main goal of the paper 
therefore is to explore the context of Hungarian international development cooperation 
and its implications on the practice and performance of the country’s international 
development policy. Three contextual sources of influence on Hungary’s external 
assistance policy are discussed: membership in the European Union (EU), wider foreign 
policy strategy and the influence of domestic stakeholders. Specifically, the following 
three research questions are formulated: (1) Has membership in the European Union had 
any effect on international development policy? (2) Is the country’s international 
development policy affected by wider strategic foreign policy goals? (3) How do the 
interests and power-relations of domestic development stakeholders affect the policy 
area?  
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The main conclusions of the paper are that membership in the EU has had little 
noticeable effect in shaping Hungary’s development policy since 2004; international 
development policy seems to serve Hungary’s external political and economic interests; 
and that although all stakeholders are rather weak, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still 
seems to play a dominating role. Convergence to European requirements and best 
practices is clearly hindered by foreign policy interests and also by the weakness of non-
governmental stakeholders. These issues make the creation of a unified vision on why 
and how Hungary should provide aid to less fortunate countries difficult. 
 
All three of the contextual sources of influence could constitute separate research 
agendas. Therefore, this paper should be seen rather as exploratory research, setting the 
agenda for future, more detailed inquires into the topic. Also, the paper does not attempt 
to describe Hungarian international policy in detail; rather it wishes to shed light on the 
dynamics behind the current state of affairs. Written material and data on Hungary’s 
international development policy is limited, and there has not been much scholarly work 
on the topic either. In order to overcome this problem, seven semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with representatives of the various stakeholders were carried out. The 
interviewees included a senior policy official and a desk officer, as well as a former 
mid-level director, all from the Directorate of International Development at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. A senior desk officer working on issues related to tied aid credits 
from the Ministry of National Economy was the fourth respondent. The last three 
respondents were three experts working at various Hungarian development NGO’s, both 
in policy issues and ‘on the field.’ For reasons of confidentiality, their identities are not 
revealed. 
 
The contribution of the paper to the literature is that it expands the rather scarce 
academic literature on development policies in the CEE countries, and provides an 
approach for understanding the evolution of the policy area in the case of Hungary. This 
sets the agenda for future, more detailed research, and can be applied to other CEE 
countries as well. The paper is structured around the three topics introduced above. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the history of Hungary’s international development policy and 
the present challenges it faces. Section 3 analyzes the effects EU membership has had 
(or has failed to have) on Hungary’s international development policy. Section 4 
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discusses the domestic policy context, and section 5 looks at the interests and relative 
power and influence of the development stakeholders. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Hungary’s international development policy: history and present challenges 
Much of the existing literature on international development policies in the CEE 
countries focuses on the history of these policies and the current challenges. Studies 
have discussed the early beginnings (Dauderstädt, ed. 2002), the difficulties and 
deficiencies faced by the CEE donors (Bucar and Mrak, 2007) and more recently the 
interactions between these new donors and the European Union (Carbone, 2004; 
Lightfoot, 2008; 2010; Horky, 2010). In the case of Hungary, the works of Kiss (2002; 
2007) and Paragi (2010) are the most important sources, as well as the report published 
by Hungary’s aid agency at the time, HUN-IDA (2004). This section does not repeat the 
findings of this literature, rather it provides a brief overview of how development policy 
emerged in Hungary and what difficulties the country faces today.  
 
All CEE countries, including Hungary, had international development policies during 
Communism. While there has hardly been any detailed academic research on these pre-
1989 development policies, the most important characteristic is easy to identify: heavy 
influence of the Soviet Union’s geostrategic objectives. This included providing 
assistance mainly to Soviet allies or developing countries with heavily leftist 
governments; no clear distinction between military and development aid; a high reliance 
on technical assistance and tied aid; and the extensive usage of scholarships (for more 
details, see Kiss, 2002; HUN-IDA, 2004). According to some estimates, the resources 
Hungary devoted to foreign assistance reached 0.7 percent of the country’s national 
income in the late seventies, although this cannot be compared with aid expenditures 
today due to methodological differences. In most CEE donors, including Hungary, the 
impact of the Communist-era development policy can be identified to this date (Szent-
Iványi and Tétényi 2008).  
 
After the end of the Cold War, Hungary terminated its international development 
policy, and turned from being a donor country into a recipient of foreign aid.2 During 
                                                 
2 Hungary was eligible for official aid between 1990 and 2004. During these 15 years, the country 
received a total of 5.1 billion dollars (in 2009 prices and exchanges rates). On an annual average, this 
amounted to 0.4-0.5 percent of Hungary’s GDP (World Bank 2011). 
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the 1990’s, there was no active bilateral development cooperation, only smaller ad hoc 
contributions to multilateral development organizations. Hungary re-started its 
international development policies due to external pressure, stemming from 
membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
in 1996 and accession to the EU in 2004. The first strategic document on international 
development cooperation was accepted in 2001 by the government and the first 
Hungarian-financed bilateral aid projects started in 2003. Due to Hungary’s historical, 
political, financial and economic conditions, the international development policy it 
created took on a very different nature than the ones the member countries of the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have. Although it is very difficult 
to talk about a single best practice in bilateral development policies among the OECD 
DAC members, as all countries have their own national characteristics (Lancaster, 2007; 
Hoebink, ed, 2007), still in the past decade an international academic and political 
consensus has emerged on the desired traits of effective national bilateral aid policies. 
This consensus includes increasing resources spent on aid, the concepts of partnership 
and ownership, untying aid, better coordination between donors, aligning donor 
activities with recipient systems, decreasing administrative burdens of recipients, a 
larger emphasis on evaluation and results etc. (See for example the outcomes of the 
Monterrey Conference in 2002, the Rome-Paris-Accra-Busan process on aid 
effectiveness, or in the case of the EU, the European Consensus on Development 
accepted in 2006).  
 
Hungary’s aid policy on the other hand is heavily donor driven and is characterized by 
low amounts spent on bilateral cooperation, a high share of tied aid, the proliferation of 
small projects, inefficient delivery structures and the almost total lack of evaluation 
(Paragi 2010). Aid is given mostly to middle income neighboring countries, which 
implies that poverty reduction is not a true goal (Szent-Iványi 2011). Table 1 shows the 
amounts Hungary spent on foreign aid relative to gross national income (GNI) between 
2003 and 2010, and compares it to the performance of the other CEE countries and the 
OECD DAC average. Hungary spent the most on international development in 2006, 
when official development assistance (ODA) reached 0.13% of GNI. This was however 
mainly due to one-off items, such debt relief to Iraq and Ethiopia. In the past years a 
clear stagnation of resources spent on development is visible. The member states of the 
EU have reiterated the need to increase resources devoted to international development, 
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but the global economic and financial crisis which began in 2008 has definitely curbed 
these ambitions. In 2010, Hungarian ODA was 0.09% of GNI, falling well short of the 
0.17% target, set within the EU back in 2005 (Bucar and Mrak, 2007). 
 
Table 1. ODA/GNI levels among the Central and Eastern European donors 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Czech Republic 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Estonia .. 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 ..
Hungary 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09
Latvia 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 ..
Lithuania 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 ..
Poland 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08
Romania .. .. .. .. .. 0.08 0.09 ..
Slovakia 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Slovenia .. .. 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.13
OECD DAC 
average 
0.25 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.32
Source: OECD (2011). 
 
The stagnation of the ODA/GNI level is a symptom of a more general lack of progress 
within Hungary’s international development policy, which cannot be explained solely 
with the deficiency of resources. The law for regulating international development 
cooperation has not been passed as of late-2011 and has been “under preparation” for 
five years. No reforms have been started to change the inefficient institutional setting 
for aid delivery, in which many line-ministries are involved with only weak central 
coordination. The evaluation of projects and learning from their experience is hardly 
given any emphasis, and no attempts have been made to strengthen this. No attempts 
have been made to start a public discourse on the issue either. The following three 
sections of the paper map three sources of potential influence on Hungarian 
development cooperation in order to explain this stagnation: the effects of EU 
membership, the foreign policy context and stakeholder interests and relations. 
 
3. The effects of EU membership 
‘Europeanization’ has become a very popular concept in the past decade for 
understanding changes and dynamics in various policy areas due to membership in the 
EU or the prospect of it. During the accession process of the CEE countries to the EU, 
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requirements were voiced that these countries should contribute to international 
development efforts – thus, the EU was a crucial factor in the re-emergence of the 
development policies of the CEE countries, and this has made the concept of 
Europeanization an increasingly popular framework to study these new policies (Vittek 
and Lightfoot 2009; Lightfoot 2010; Horky 2010). The concept can be useful for 
structuring the discussion on how EU membership has affected Hungarian development 
policy. 
 
Europeanization is most generally understood as the process through which countries 
adopt formal and informal European rules and policies (Graziano and Vink, 2007, p. 7; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 7). The basic model on Europeanization, 
advocated by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001, pp. 6-12) states that laws (institutions, 
methods, processes, norms, behavioral rules etc.) originating from the EU level may be 
incongruous with relevant legislation of the nation states. Depending on how large this 
gap is, pressures arise for the nation state to adapt to the ‘European way’ of doing 
things. However, these pressures are mediated through domestic institutions, and a 
multitude of factors will influence whether and how the country actually changes its 
policies. In the end some national institutional and policy outcome will emerge, which 
may eliminate or reduce the original misfit, or even leave it unchanged. The pressures 
for change therefore may still remain, and the entire process starts again in a cyclical 
manner.  
 
The two main channels for Europeanization to happen are through conditionality and 
socialization (Checkel 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Juncos 2010). In 
case of the former, member states are obliged to comply with any hard legislation 
accepted by the EU institutions. The EU can formulate explicit conditions towards 
accession countries as well, and often it can have an even larger leverage on these 
countries than it has on its own members (i.e. their accession process can be stalled if 
they do not comply). On the other hand, a more constructivist approach to 
Europeanization emphasizes the importance of longer term socialization and social 
learning. This involves the internalization of European values and formal rules, as well 
as the gradual development of the conviction that that is the only proper way to act. 
While Europeanization through conditionality can be rather explicit and quick, social 
learning is a slow process and also much more difficult to identify in practice. The two 
 8
approaches however, while relying on different theoretical backgrounds, are not 
mutually exclusive. In policy areas where conditionality and coercion are not possible, 
social learning can be the only channel for Europeanization to occur.  
 
The question therefore is: can one find evidence of Europeanization in Hungary’s 
development policy? In the past two decades the EU has attempted to considerably 
increase its influence on bilateral member state development policies, but the EU also 
had a chance to prescribe explicit criteria to Hungary during the accession negotiations.  
 
The EU’s influence on member states comes from several sources. The Treaty of 
Maastricht introduced qualitative requirements for both EU-level and member state 
development policies with the concepts of complementarily, coherence and coordination 
(the so-called 3C’s, see Hoebink 2004). Concerning quantitative requirements, in 2002 
the European Council reaffirmed that member states must increase their aid spending to 
0.7% of their gross national incomes by 2015, and set an intermediate goal of 0.39% by 
2006. In 2005, a new intermediate goal was established for 2010 of 0.56%, and a 
separate goal was set for the new member states of 0.17% (Bucar and Mrak 2007, p. 7). 
Also, in 2005 a joint statement by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, 
entitled the ‘European Consensus on Development’, created a new framework for the 
EU’s common development policy and also laid down many requirements for the 
individual member states. Other requirements include untying aid (European 
Commission 2002), focusing aid on Africa, increasing aid effectiveness (European 
Commission 2006; 2007) and implementing internationally agreed best practices such 
as the Paris Declaration or the Accra Agenda (Council of the European Union 2011).  
 
Europeanization in the short term can be most effective through explicit conditionality. 
However, almost all the requirements the EU voices towards member states in the field 
of international development fall into the category of soft law, i.e. they are mainly 
recommendations. The EU could have formulated conditions during Hungary’s 
accession negotiations, but it did not. It is well documented that international 
development (included in the negotiating chapter on trade) was neglected during the 
accession negotiations and no specific requirements were voiced, besides the fact that 
Hungary, as all other CEE countries, must create such a policy (Fodor 2003). According 
to one of the foreign ministry official interviewed, the EU missed its only possibility to 
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exert any true influence on the course Hungary’s emerging international development 
policy took. Without any explicit conditions however, there was no reason for Hungary 
to adopt the practices advocated by the EU.  
 
The actual ‘hard’ requirements (i.e. binding rules to which the member states are legally 
required to conform to) the EU has in place in the field are all either highly technical, 
such as the classification of aid projects and reporting on specific issues such as policy 
coherence; or related to financial issues, such as contribution to the European 
Development Fund (EDF). In this sense, according to a ministry official interviewed, 
there is evidence of Europeanization, but it is rather limited and has no significant 
influence on actual policies. 
 
If there is no explicit conditionality and no ‘hard’ pressure, that would leave 
socialization as the main channel for the Europeanization of Hungary’s development 
policy. Officials at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and other line 
ministries involved in international development of course have continuous interactions 
with the EU, as they take part in the comitology system of the integration. They 
frequently interact with officials from other member states and from the European 
Commission. It is very difficult to draw any conclusion on the extent of social learning, 
but there are many factors hindering it, such as the high turnover of MFA staff and the 
perceptions dominating in the ministry on what interests and comparative advantages 
Hungary has. According to the respondents, the perception that Hungarian interests 
dictate a different type of international development policy than what the EU tries to 
advocate seems dominant within the MFA. All three ministry officials interviewed seem 
to believe that Hungarian development policy should not follow blindly the 
requirements of the EU, but should take Hungary’s situation into account as well. For 
example, they maintain that Hungary should receive economic and political benefits 
from giving aid and thus tying aid to exports is justified. They do acknowledge that 
many issues that the EU raises, such as placing a greater emphasis on evaluation and 
feedback are generally important, but Hungary has other priorities, such as building a 
constituency for aid. As these issues are related to the other two sources of influence on 
Hungarian external development policy, they will be discussed in more detail below. 
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European values and norms on development are therefore far from being internalized by 
the Hungarian MFA officials. They have learned to “talk the talk”, but the impression 
from the interviews was that they mostly see the various committee meetings as terrains 
for pursuing national interest and not opportunities for themselves to learn and adapt.  
 
In sum, the current practice of Hungarian development policy is rather far from the soft 
requirements of the EU. Conditionality is only present on the technical level and has 
had no real effect on policies. There seems to be little evidence for social learning 
either, but this can be due to the fact that Hungary has not been a member of the EU 
long enough for the mechanics of social learning to kick in. It is concluded that there is 
little evidence of Europeanization in Hungary’s international development policy. 
 
3. Foreign Policy Strategy and Development 
The second source of influence on Hungarian international development policy is the 
wider foreign policy context. It is widely agreed that foreign aid is a tool of foreign 
policy, and can be used to serve specific foreign policy goals, such influencing other 
countries, building alliances, creating stability and increasing national security 
(Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2005). This section identifies the main 
strategic goals of Hungary’s foreign policy, and then looks at how these relate to the 
current allocation of foreign aid. 
 
After the end of Communism, a consensual Hungarian foreign policy strategy emerged. 
This strategy rested on three pillars: (1) integration in the Euro-Atlantic community; (2) 
the protection of ethnic Hungarians living abroad; and (3) good relations with 
neighboring countries. While this strategy served Hungary well throughout the nineties, 
it became obsolete as Hungary joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in 1999 and the EU 2004. It was also realized that protecting ethnic Hungarians (most 
of them living in the neighboring countries) inevitably led to conflicts with the 
neighbors, and so the two second priorities needed to be reconciled in some manner. 
After a long preparatory work involving more than 100 experts and academics, a new 
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foreign policy strategy was accepted by the government in 2008, meant to be valid until 
2020.3 
 
The new strategy also rests on three pillars, which to some extent refine the three pillars 
of the previous strategy and also expand them (Hungarian Government 2008). Pillar one 
is entitled ‘Competitive Hungary in the European Union’, which details Hungary’s 
interests in relation to the EU. These include maintaining and deepening the integration, 
maintaining community solidarity, keeping the integration open (including future 
enlargements) and increasing Europe’s competitive position and global influence. Pillar 
two is ‘Successful Hungarians in the region’, which basically attempts to reconcile the 
contradictions between protecting the interests of Hungarian minorities and good 
relations with the neighbors. This pillar stresses regional cooperation for mutual 
benefits, emphasizes stability and development in the Balkans and the Eastern countries 
(and the importance of their EU and NATO accession), and also the need for Hungary 
to serve as a major investor and trading partner in the region. The support of Hungarian 
minorities is a further key issue here, but it is placed into an EU framework, and the 
strategy also emphasizes the protection of non-Hungarian minorities living in Hungary. 
Finally, pillar three in entitled ‘Responsible Hungary in the world’. This objective 
includes contributing to global peace, the spread of democratic values and human rights, 
promoting global governance, combating climate change, reducing global poverty and 
increasing global security. 
 
The question is how international development policy relates to these three pillars. Due 
to the nature of development policy, and the requirements of the EU, it should mainly 
be serving the strategic objectives outlined in pillar three, i.e. issues like global poverty 
reduction. Hungary’s foreign policy strategy includes three paragraphs on international 
development cooperation, which seem to reinforce this idea. In these paragraphs, a 
reference is made to the Millennium Development Goals and how Hungary supports the 
efforts of the international donor community in achieving them; a commitment to 
increase ODA and reach the 0.17 and 0.33 percent ODA/GNI targets set by the Council 
of the EU for 2010 and 2015. The third paragraph is meant to discuss the geographic 
                                                 
3 The current Hungarian government, in power since 2010 and led by the conservative FIDESZ, has 
signaled the need for a new strategy. However, work on it has not started and no information on future 
directions can be found on the website of the government as of late-2011.  
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focus of Hungarian aid, which besides mentioning the importance of Africa, emphasizes 
maintaining a close relationship with Southern and Eastern Europe and the Far East.  
 
However, based on data on Hungarian aid allocation and interviews with ministry staff 
and NGO’s, it can be argued that Hungarian international development policy mainly 
serves pillar two of the strategy, i.e. helping Hungary and Hungarians become 
‘successful’ in the CEE region. A glance at aid allocation data from the MFA’s report 
on the implementation of official development and humanitarian assistance in 2010 
(Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011) illustrates this point well, but the 
conclusions are valid for earlier years as well (Szent-Ivanyi 2011). In 2010, Hungary 
spent 113 million US dollars on ODA, of which approximately 26.6 million were 
channeled bilaterally. Table 2 shows a breakdown of these bilateral funds. 
 
Table 2. The regional allocation of Hungary’s bilateral aid in 2010 
Region Amount (thousand dollars) Share in total (%) 
South-East Europe and CIS 8 892 33 
of which: support to  
Hungarian minorities  
3 927 15 
Afghanistan 5 555 21 
Africa 762 3 
Other regions 2 932 11 
Costs of refugees in Hungary 6 096 23 
Unallocated* 2 353 9 
Total bilateral 26 590 100 
*: The budget spent by the MFA itself is not broken down in the report. Most of it was probably allocated 
to Afghanistan, and it also includes the amounts spent on humanitarian aid. 
Source: calculations of the author, based on Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011, pp. 36-47). 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, countries in the Balkans and in the former Soviet region 
receive the highest chunk of Hungary’s bilateral aid. A significant portion of these 
resources (15% of total bilateral aid) is actually channeled to support ethic Hungarians 
in Serbia and the Ukraine. Only 3% of Hungary’s bilateral aid is channeled to African 
countries, and even that is mainly in the form of scholarships to Hungary, so some may 
argue that it benefits Hungary even more in the form of brain drain than it does the 
African countries. The single largest receiving county is however Afghanistan, where 
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Hungary, as a part of the NATO coalition is in charge of a provincial reconstruction 
team, and therefore has an international obligation to contribute to the development of 
the country. Looking at the aid allocation data, it is clear that it is more in-line with 
second pillar foreign policy objectives than it is with global poverty reduction. 
Developing countries (with the exception of Afghanistan), where poverty is a huge 
issue, democratic values and the respect for human rights have much to ask for and the 
quality of governance is low receive much lower amounts of aid than middle income 
neighboring countries, relations with which are crucial for pillar two of the strategy.  
 
The interviews basically reinforced this conclusion based on aid allocation data. 
Respondents from the MFA mentioned that Hungary’s main comparative advantages 
and foreign policy interests dictate giving aid to the neighboring countries, and to those 
countries which Hungarian actors ‘know well’, the latter clearly implying countries with 
which Hungary has had more extensive development relations during Communism, 
such as Vietnam, the Palestinian Authority, or Yemen. Hungarian NGO’s and private 
companies clearly have some advantages in the neighboring countries, but giving aid to 
such partners is also underpinned by foreign and security policy considerations, such as 
the need for regional stability. One respondent cited the case of the Kosovo war in 1999, 
which had an adverse affect on foreign investments to Hungary. The official 
interviewed from the Ministry of National Economy mainly emphasized economic 
interests, saying that foreign aid should be used as a tool to pave the way for Hungarian 
exports and investments in the neighboring countries.  
 
Hungary is not perceived to have any comparative advantage in giving aid to Africa. As 
mentioned by an MFA respondent, Africa is for ‘the big players’. Building a presence in 
Africa in order to deliver efficient development aid has high fixed costs, which Hungary 
cannot afford. As Hungary currently only has two embassies in Sub-Saharan African 
countries (in South Africa and Kenya), one can hardly argue that the continent figures 
highly among foreign policy and international development considerations. 
 
NGO respondents complained that poverty reduction is not a true goal of Hungary’s 
international development policy, because if it were, Hungary would devote a larger 
attention to regions where the return on aid in terms of people lifted out of poverty was 
higher. It was also mentioned that the lack of the MFA’s attention towards Africa is 
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highly frustrating and makes the work of NGO’s dedicated towards the region highly 
difficult.  
 
One may argue that the relatively large amounts spent in Afghanistan can be attributed 
to the third pillar of Hungary’s foreign policy strategy, and so can multilateral aid 
(which makes up some 75% percent of Hungary’s total ODA). However, the Hungarian 
mission in Afghanistan seems to be perceived as an international obligation, and much 
of Hungary’s multilateral aid is based on compulsory membership fees, and so the 
country has little freedom in deciding how much it pays and how it is spent. References 
in the foreign policy strategy to global poverty, the MDG’s, or the respect for human 
rights may thus be a further example of Hungarian politicians and officials having 
learned to ‘talk the talk’ of international development, but they are not supported 
strongly by aid allocation.  
 
Summing up this section and answering the second research question, it is clear that 
Hungary’s international development policy is affected by wider foreign policy, as 
foreign aid is used to a large extent to promote Hungarian political and economic 
interests in the region, such as maintaining stability, helping ethnic Hungarians and 
building economic opportunities for Hungarian companies. Aid is used to a much lesser 
extent in decreasing global poverty, promoting the respect for human rights, i.e. the 
goals elaborated in pillar three of the country’s foreign policy strategy.  
 
4. Development stakeholders  
The third potential source of influence on international development policy are power 
relations between domestic stakeholders and their interests. The literature on how 
domestic dynamics affect international development policy in the OECD DAC member 
donor countries is still rather sparse, and these dynamics are not well understood. 
Lancaster (2007) is one of the few comprehensive works, which analysis these interior 
dynamics in the case of the US, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark. 
 
Major foreign aid stakeholders include political parties, the government organizations 
and officials actually working on foreign aid, NGO’s, business interests and the wider 
public. Political parties may have their own preferences, for example socialist parties 
may put a larger emphasis on solidarity (Hopkins 2000). Governing parties also react to 
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the wider public opinion, although international development – like foreign policy in 
general – is not highly sensitive to it (Otter 2003).  
 
Within the government, the bureaucracies that take part in the day-to-day practice of 
international development are also major stakeholders. In fact, ministry officials can 
often have an important role in shaping policy, if political attention on the topic is low, 
or other interest groups are divided. In many OECD DAC countries it was the officials 
of the foreign ministries that pushed for reforms. Lancaster (2007: 101) mentions the 
State Department and USAID as important constituents for giving aid in the US. In case 
of the reform of the EU’s common development policy, the officials in the Commission 
played a leading role (Carbone 2007). Staff working on international development 
issues may be more concerned about aid effectiveness, because their prestige and future 
budget depends on the impact of their work. Thus, such staff may push for aid policies 
that are likely to increase the impact of aid. As shown below, this is not the case in 
Hungary. 
 
Other stakeholders include those who are profiting from the ‘development business’, 
either financially or otherwise: private companies and development NGO’s. It is clear 
that one cannot lump NGO’s and private companies into a single group, as NGO’s – 
while also making a living from international development – do not seek profit, but 
rather have ethical and moral motivations. While private companies most likely prefer 
aid practices which provide them with clear benefits (such as tied aid), NGO’s generally 
advocate practices which involve increasing levels of aid, are more beneficial for the 
partners, and more in-line with international best practices. Lancaster (2007: 103) notes 
that NGO’s and business coalitions in the US lobbied together successfully to block cuts 
of foreign aid in the 1980’s. 
 
The remainder of this section briefly analyzes the interests and relative power of two 
major development stakeholders in Hungary: the MFA and development NGO’s. As 
mentioned earlier, international development issues are not part of the everyday political 
dialogue in Hungary, in fact they hardly ever are an issue. Political parties rarely raise 
the topic, which clearly indicates that they do not figure high on the political agenda. 
Due to this, the interests of these political actors will not be discussed. While private 
companies that benefit from the aid business do exist in Hungary, their numbers are 
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definitely low and they are difficult to identify, therefore their role is only discussed 
marginally. 
 
Due to the lack of political attention, the bureaucracy of the MFA may have larger 
possibilities to define how international development policy is shaped. The institutional 
set-up for international development in Hungary is highly fragmented: there is no single 
budget-line for foreign aid, almost all line-ministries are involved to some degree. The 
MFA has a central, coordinating role, and is also in charge of policy formulation. This 
coordination is carried out by two committees, one on the ministerial level and another 
on the level of officials and experts from various ministries working on international 
development. However, it became clear from the interviews that the MFA usually has 
no real power to influence other ministries on how they determine their priorities and 
how they spend their aid-budgets. All line ministries seem to have their own 
understanding of what foreign is or what it should be used for, and the MFA has no 
authority over their decisions. In 2010, the MFA actually only controlled about 25 
percent of bilateral ODA (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p. 36). 
 
MFA officials complained that much of their weakness and inability to influence other 
official actors is related to the lack of resources. They mentioned that their work has 
become very difficult in the past years, as Hungary has been facing strong needs to cut 
budget expenditures since 2006, which were exacerbated by the global crisis even 
further. The respondents from NGO’s added that the MFA also lacks expertise. An 
example they gave is that the turnaround of staff in the MFA is high and many of them 
do not seem to have a clear understanding of what international development should 
actually be about. 
 
Still, MFA officials, while acknowledging their constraints, argued that they do 
everything they can to promote ‘Hungarian interests’, also on the EU-level. MFA 
officials were well aware of the fact that development policy tools often serve foreign 
policy interests other than global development (as discussed in section 3). In fact, the 
most surprising theme from the interviews was that development staff in the MFA 
actually seemed to support this approach. They saw no contradiction here, as they 
argued that Hungary should contribute to ‘regional’ development, as it has ‘comparative 
advantages’ in the region that other donors do not. According to this argument, poverty 
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stricken regions like Sub-Saharan Africa are for donors who have more resources and 
also possess large and strong NGO’s and private companies to implement projects. 
Countries like Hungary however, who lack such large actors, need a different approach 
and must make the fostering of ‘local aid champions’ a part of their policies. This theme 
emerged in many different forms during the interviews, and it was mostly the 
government officials, both from the MFA and the Ministry of National Economy who 
mentioned it, and not the NGO’s. One issue closely related to this was the EDF – one of 
the respondents emphasized the fact that Hungarian companies and individual experts 
are rarely competitive enough to win international development tenders and grants 
financed from the EDF. According to this logic, the money Hungary contributes to the 
Fund (almost €125 million between 2008 and 2013) is effectively lost for Hungary. 
Apparently the MFA even lobbied to change the rules of the EDF in order to provide 
some form of positive discrimination not only for companies and NGO’s from the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, but also to ones from CEE. A second 
related issue is tied aid, which has already been mentioned, but should be reiterated 
here. The Ministry of National Economy, which is in charge of the budget for tied-aid 
credits, perceives the various forms of tied aid solely as a tool for helping Hungarian 
enterprises to gain international presence.  
 
The need to use development policy to strengthen Hungarian development actors and 
serve foreign policy interests can explain why Hungary may resist pressures from the 
EU to untie aid, make a greater use program based aid, or use practices which may lead 
to greater ownership of the recipient. It can explain why the MFA failed to act as a 
catalyst in promoting this adaptation. It is not clear however, whether this is actually a 
true conviction of MFA officials, or is it just rhetoric towards the Hungarian 
government which they think can help them secure funds. 
 
Turning to development NGO’s, their weakness stemming in part from the Communist 
era and Hungary’s relatively lower incomes, is still a problem they must overcome. 
Financing their activities can often seem daunting: raising resources from donations has 
proven difficult, so they must rely on grants from the state or international 
organizations. The actions and power of development NGO’s however clearly depends 
on the amount of resources they can draw on, public support for their cause and also the 
way governments and ministry officials perceive the activities (and usefulness) of 
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NGO’s. So what influence do NGO’s have Hungarian development policy making? 
Hungarian NGO’s, and their platform organization HAND are highly active in 
lobbying. HAND had a high profile during the Hungarian EU presidency in the first half 
of 2011, organizing a multitude of events and producing policy papers. Recently, a 
group of NGO’s drafted a strategy recommendation for the MFA on Hungarian 
engagement with Africa. NGO’s are also active in monitoring the government, as 
shown by the Aid Watch Reports published in 2007 (Kiss 2007) and 2011. They are 
also represented on an advisory committee that formally meets once a year to discuss 
the implementation of international development policy in the previous year and 
formulate recommendations for the future. According to the MFA’s report on the 
implementation of international development assistance in 2010, ministry officials also 
met formally every “one or two months” with representatives of HAND, and 
participated on events organized by the platform if invited (Hungarian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2011: 32). Therefore, it is clear that despite their lack of resources, 
NGO’s do try to shape Hungary’s international development policy, using both formal 
institutions and other means. They are committed to increasing the effectiveness of aid, 
emphasizing global poverty reduction, and also increasing the transparency of the MFA 
and other ministries. 
 
Respondents from NGO’s however complained that the MFA does not treat them as 
partners. The flow of information from the ministry is slow at best and the opinions of 
NGO’s are rarely asked for. Their requests for information often take a long time to be 
processed, and grant applications often include unfavorable conditions for them, 
although in the past years due to austerity measures, the MFA’s budget for such grants 
has greatly decreased. The formal meetings seem to the NGO’s as little more than talk 
shops, as the problems raised are rarely followed up or acted upon. In fact, one 
respondent mentioned that the MFA seems to treat them with outright hostility, which 
seems to be in stark contrast with what ministry officials have said about the need to 
strengthen domestic NGO’s. This contradiction may be difficult to explain. While it 
may point to differences in perceptions, it may also hint towards the possibility that 
helping domestic actors is just rhetoric on the side of the MFA. Or – as one NGO 
respondent put it – the MFA simply does not like being told what to do. 
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All these issues may imply that NGO’s are not able to exert substantial influence on 
Hungary’s international development policy. Still, most NGO’s do agree that they did 
have an important impact in the past years in making the MFA more transparent and 
forcing it to disclose more information publicly on its activities. Summing up this 
section, both the MFA and development NGO’s have weaknesses, but it seems that the 
former is more powerful and thus able to have a larger influence on international 
development. However, the MFA seems to favor a policy which is aligned with 
Hungarian political and economic interests and not so much with global poverty 
reduction. The reasons for the MFA’s motivations are unclear. Higher level political 
interest in the issue, as well as clear political and strategic guidance are greatly needed. 
 
Conclusions 
The paper has discussed three potential sources of influence which may have had a role 
in shaping Hungary’s emerging international development policy in the past decade: 
membership in the EU, Hungarian foreign policy priorities, and relationships and 
relative power of domestic stakeholders. These three factors are of course heavily 
interrelated and all three must be taken into consideration when explaining the evolution 
of Hungary’s international development policy. 
 
The main conclusion that emerges is that in the past decade Hungary’s international 
development policy seems to have been guided mainly by Hungary’s political and 
economic interests, as the close links between the country’s foreign policy strategy and 
aid allocation demonstrate. Foreign aid is used to a much lesser extent to promote global 
development and poverty reduction. The requirements of the EU in this policy area 
(mainly in the domain of soft law), which mandate the increase of aid effectiveness in 
decreasing global poverty have had little impact on Hungary’s practice. One potential 
reason for this can be found in the dynamics between the domestic stakeholders: 
development staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seem to support the current 
approach, and therefore the MFA has failed to act as a catalyst in orienting development 
policy towards a more global, poverty-focused approach. Higher level political guidance 
is lacking and development NGO’s are too weak to achieve any substantial influence. 
 
These dynamics may allow one to draw conclusions on the potential future evolution of 
Hungarian development cooperation. Most importantly, convergence to EU practices 
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will likely be slow, and it will only take place as incomes and development experience 
in Hungary increase, allowing the country to play more of a global role, and also 
strengthening development actors. International pressures which try to push for a quick 
adaptation of Hungary’s international development policy to European or other 
standards are likely to be unsuccessful.  
 
As emphasized in the introduction, this research should be seen as exploratory, and all 
three sources of influence need further investigation, especially concerning the casual 
mechanics. Future research may also attempt to uncover similar dynamics in other CEE 
countries and thus provide a possibility for comparison. 
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